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Abstract
The development of an IS for an organization is a project of a strategic nature. The development
process is a time-consuming and special budgeted project that follows the six stages of the System
Development Life Cycle (SDLC). Integrating security within the SDLC is a very important issue. The
security of an IS is designed at the very early stages of its development. A security object that is
nowadays a must is the Disaster Recovery Plan. Security questions like “Is the Information System
Security an issue that has to be a matter of concern for the organization from the start of Information
System development?” and “At which stage of its development does an Information System begin to be
at risk ?” concern both the organizations and the developers. This paper proposes the enhancement of
the SDLC stages in order to reduce the risks from the start of a development, by integrating the
development of the Disaster Recovery Plan into the SDLC process. Details are given on how to achieve
this, as well as the reasons and the benefits to the organization and to the manufacturer.
Keywords: Disaster Recovery, SDLC, Information System Development, Information System Security,
Data Security

1

INTRODUCTION

In the early days of IS, decision making – at all levels of an organization – was made based on manually
processed information. This information was the result of a time-consuming gathering effort in a
market that did not change so fast. Moreover, the competition was “local” or “regional” and only
occasionally “national” or “international”.
As the nature of the competition started to change and became more global, the need for accurate,
timely and effective decisions increased. These decisions, most of the times, reflect the organization’s
reactions to the market in order to avoid or overcome the competition. These reactions are strongly
dependent on the information that the organization perceives about the market or even about its
administrative operations, as, in the era of the Globalization, the competition may come by an unknown
and invisible competitor who can operate better. Thus, reactions will have to be more sophisticated,
which means that organizations cannot afford to rely on decision-making without the support of some
Information System, the utilization of which seems to be indispensable nowadays.
The increasing adoption of IS by organizations in all industries has led them to install ISs which, most of
the times, are “suited” to their needs rather than “tailored” to those. This happens because the
majority of the organizations face the IS as a cost center (Souliotis & Papadakis 2007); hence they try to
reduce its installation expenses at the expense of compromising their needs. By operating this
compromised system, organizations depend themselves more and more upon it; thereupon, they
cannot operate without being supported by the IS.
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On the other hand, the development of an IS tailored to the needs and requirements of an organization
is a very serious project. Usually organizations face the administration of such a project as a technical
project. The organization appoints someone with technical responsibilities in charge of the IS
development, expecting that s/he will be able to understand and satisfy the functional-business
requirements of the organization. When this is the case, the development of the system is more
“technically oriented” than “business” or “function oriented”. The person charged with the
administration of the project has to control financial, functional, administrative (e.g. approvals) and
social activities (like resistance to change) in order for the investment not to fail. The development and
installation of an IS for an organization is an effort proportional to the magnitude of the organization.
Thus, the failure of an IS development project may bring the organization to a financial crisis (Stefanou
2003). Instead, the success of the project can give the organization the competitive advantage (if the
system is innovative), better administrative self-control or it may help bring into effect a strategic
target. For these reasons, organizations have to appoint a top executive for leading the IS development
project, who will also have decision making rights. The most important reason for charging a top
executive with the leadership is that s/he has to make decisions about the development of the system,
which will affect the organization in its business nature. A number of such decisions pertain to the
security of the Information System.
A survey (Rainer et al. 2007) about the way that Business Managers and Information Security
Professionals view information security issues reveals that the two groups have different views on
security. However, it is interesting to note that the “Business continuity and Disaster preparation” issue
is listed among the top-10 of 142 security items (managerial and technical), a fact indicating
convergence in the views of both groups. The IT Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) is significant to the
organization, due to the dependence of the organization on the IS. Depending on the business sector
that the organization is active in, its survival may be directly linked to the operation of its IT system. We
can take as an example the case of a bank, or a financial organization or a healthcare establishment
(HCE). A possible disaster of its IS forces the organization to interrupt its operations until the system is
rebuilt to a point of being capable of servicing at least the organization’s basic needs. In view of the
consequences of being out-of-business for prolonged periods of time, the decision for the development
of an IT-DRP for the security of the IS seems to be unavoidable for such organizations. The process for
developing an IT-DRP is very demanding and one through which the organization learns itself better, in
order to decide about the level of the disaster protection that it wants to apply. At the beginning of the
DRP development a Business Impact Analysis (BIA) will identify and categorise the Critical Business
Functions (CBFs) that are necessary for the organization’s survival. The results of the BIA will be the
basis for the Risk Analysis tailored to the needs of the specific IS (Aggelinos & Katsikas 2007). At this
point the organization is able to define its recovery strategy and then to proceed with formulating its ITDRP, taking into account at least the off-site storage, the place and kind of the recovery site. It is also
able to establish its Recovery Time Objects (RTOs) and Recovery Point Objects (RPOs). The Disaster
Recovery Plan has to be directly linked to the Business Continuity Plan (BCP), so as to support the
business functions that the organization wants to recover immediately, i.e. the CBFs.
Accepting the view that the development of an Information System is both a technical and a business
issue, the organization has to reconsider its attitude about IS development. As the IS can affect the
whole organization positively or negatively, the development of an IS has to be considered as a strategy
and not as a cost center (Souliotis & Papadakis 2007). As a strategy target, the IS has to be protected
against the risks that may threaten it. Here, a very important question arises: “Is the Information System
Security an issue that has to be a matter of concern for the organization from the start of Information
System development process?” The answer to this question cannot be given readily but it generates
another one important question: “At which stage of its development does an Information System begin
to be at risk?”
This paper attempts to answer these two questions while indicating to organizations the way to act in
order to have a secure development which, in turn, leads to protecting their investment. It proposes
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enhancing the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) stages with Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP)
activities, in order for the system to be ready for emergency operation at the end of the
implementation stage.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we review the standard system
development life cycle. In Section 3 we propose enhancing the standard life cycle model with DRPrelated activities; in Section 4 we examine the benefits from adopting such an enhancement and we
conclude with Section 5.

2

SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE

The development of an Information System either suited or tailored follows a general procedure known
as System Development Life Cycle (SDLC). This cycle follows six (6) stages, which are shown in figure 1
(Weaver et al. 2002). In the case of a suited IS, some initial activities have already been performed by
the manufacturer, but in the case of a tailored system these activities have to be performed by the
organization. In both the “suited” and the “tailored” case, the SDLC starts with the “Strategy Planning”
stage, a fact denoting that any decision about the development of a system has to have a strategic
orientation to serve a strategic target.
Strategy Planning

Feasibility Study

System Analysis

System Design

Implementation

Maintenance
Figure 1: Traditional System
Development Life Cycle (SDLC)

When developing an IS, an organization runs an IS development method and covers the first four stages
of the SDLC. The structure of many IS development methodologies follows that of the SDLC. Of these
methodologies, perhaps the most well-known is the Structured Systems Analysis and Design
Methodology (SSADM). It is the standard information systems development method for UK government
projects, and has become a de facto standard for the UK private sector (Weaver et al. 2002), (Down et
al. 1992). The Implementation stage of the SDLC includes the trial period and the final acceptance of the
information system by the project administrator. In the trial period, the system is operated by the users
in their daily duties in order to ascertain the problems and resolve them. After that, the system is fully
operative and it must be protected against security risks.
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Deploying security measures and educating users accordingly is a time-consuming process, whose time
requirements depend on the size of the system, as the time needed for training the users on a system
with standard objects (e.g. strange emails, deceptive web sites, frequent password changes etc) is quite
reduced compared to that needed for another system that uses more complex measures, such as
cryptographic keys, USB identifiers, smart cards etc. If all this is done after the system has been put into
productive operation, the resulting time-gap during which the system is unprotected (or at least underprotected) may become very important, particularly if the information system replaces a legacy system,
as is more often than not the case nowadays. A possible disaster (physical or logical) at this point could
bring the organization to a very difficult financial and legal position. The organization will not be able to
fulfil its obligations, and the time to recover and to come back to “business as usual” can prove crucial
for its future. In addition, the organization will have spent a vast amount for an IS that will not be able
to use even in its simplest operation. At this point, the organization will realize that it should have been
protected against a potential disaster and that it should have provided for emergency operation of the
system. Given the limited resources that may be allocated for emergency operations, the organization
should have pre-decided the business functions that could be served in case of emergency and,
consequently, the logical and physical design of the pertinent requirements.
Therefore, an Information System begins to be at risk early in the SDLC, when entering the
implementation stage, at the end of which the IS is at full risk. The extent of the risk that an
organization takes cannot be unambiguous because the value of the system for the organization is
subjective and depends on the value that the IS perceives by the information it processes
[quantitatively (financial use) or qualitatively (decision making use)]; the degree to which the
organization relies upon the system; the budget of the investment; the extent to which the system is
used within the organization; the capability of the organization to switch swiftly to a manual mode of
business operations; and a number of other, less significant, factors. The mitigation of this risk has to be
proactive rather than reactive. For this reason, the security design of the system has to focus on
approaches that ensure effective counteraction on potentially problematic areas (Tryfonas &
Kiountouzis 2001). This in turn means that the organization has to be ready for Emergency Operation
(EO) at the end of the implementation stage. The EO is completely different than the Normal Operation
(NO), and requires different and fast deployment of pre-decided plans.
The fact that information security designs should be carried out as early as possible in the system
development lifecycle and particularly should be incorporated within the system requirements
specification stage has been long established (Baskerville 1993, Kalloniatis et al 2008). It has also found
its way into relevant standards (Kissel et al. 2008), where it is recommended that many security issues
are dealt with in the initiation phase of a 5-phase SDLC– which corresponds to the Strategy and
Feasibility Study stages. However, it is unfortunate that this long established and well known -among
information professionals- has still a long way to go to be observed in practice. A doctoral thesis
(Tryfonas 2003) has studied the difficulties of integrating security into the traditional system
development life cycle and has reached the conclusion that the security analysis of a system in the form
of specifications/provisions is performed only after the end of its development. The same holds true
even more for DRP development activities. Taking into account the fact that the development of a DRP
may take anything from some weeks to two years –depending on the size of the organization and of the
system-, it seems, by direct analogy reasoning, that by enhancing the traditional SDLC stages to include
DRP development activities in early stages of the process one would avoid having a system at risk for
long periods of time.

3

ENHANCING THE SDLC STAGES

In view of the above, it seems that the earlier the DRP is completed, the better to the IS development
stakeholders. Therefore, we propose enhancing the SDLC stages in a way so that the Disaster Recovery
Plan will be ready at the end of the Implementation stage. Figure 2 depicts the proposed
enhancements.
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As it can be seen, the enhancement of the stages is done in a hybrid manner, taking into account the
hierarchical structure of the SDLC model. In the first four stages, DRP activities run in parallel with the
activities concerning the development of the system in normal operation. This means that the normal
operation development can move to the next stage in order to save time, but the completion of the
stage will be done only after taking into account the DRP decisions/activities for emergency operations.
In the two last stages the DRP activities are appended to those of normal operations development. This
means that the stages cannot be completed – and consequently we cannot move to the next stage –
without having completed the corresponding DRP activities. In each stage of the SDLC a deliverable has
to be produced, which will provide the basis for the next stage, thus requiring an extensive
documentation to be produced within each phase (Stefanou 2003).

Feasibility Study

DRP

System Design

DRP

System Analysis

DRP

Strategy Planning

DRP

In more detail, in the Strategy Planning stage the organization may decide about the target of the
development, the deadline, the project manager, the business units that will be served, the amount to
spend, outsourcing, the developer, the conformity with laws and standards, the level of maintenance
(SLAs), third parties connection capability and a number of other decisions for normal operations. These
decisions are enough to move to the next stage – always concerning normal operations.

Implementation
DRP

Maintenance
DRP

Figure 2: Altered System
Development Life Cycle (SDLC)

In the DRP parallel section, the strategy planning of the organization, has to include decisions about
emergency operations that will allow the proper design of the EO system. These decisions pertain to the
site and the precise location where the system will operate in EO; the kind of site (cold, hot, warm); the
business units that need to be covered; the desired switching time to EO; initial RTOs and RPOs (e.g.
equipment procurement in the first 6 working hours); the maximum time allowed to remain in EO; the
incorporation of the plan into the annual budget; the percentage of the NO system budget to be spent
for the EO system; the DRP coordinator; the alliances with similar organizations for mutual assistance;
the standards for conformity (e.g. BS-7799, ISO 27001, BS-25999); and some more DRP strategy
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planning decisions such as revision time, liabilities and responsibilities at managerial level etc.
(Aggelinos & Katsikas 2007).
In the Feasibility Study stage the organization has to consider the technical, financial, legal, operational,
organizational and the strategic feasibility of the development and (or) the acquisition of the system.
There is a practical difficulty here: The Feasibility Study needs as input information that is produced in
the next stage, as it is impossible to have accurate information about the requirements that need to be
covered and about the risks with their proposed solutions. Without this information, the results of the
study will be either overestimated or underestimated. In either case the project is jeopardized due to
improper budgeting. This is why we adopt the usual analyst’s practice, according to which the Feasibility
Study is performed after the System Analysis stage, when the organization knows exactly what it wants
to do and what it has to pay for. This practice is more expensive for the organization but it is safer for
the execution of the project and the whole investment.
In the next stage, the System Analysis, the organization first has to investigate the existing system (if
any) and generally the informational environment that already exists. This organizational study has to
be documented, taking into account all the electronic and hard copies, the user information needs, data
flows etc. Then the stage proceeds with the analysis of the documented investigation findings. The
deliverable of this stage is a report including the current situation (such as the kind of data, data flows,
available systems and their users, user problems, hardcopy templates, etc) and the situation that needs
to be served (such as new business units, user requirements, new data flows, user rights, electronic
required approvals, external/third party connections, initial security policy requirements, conformity
with law and regulations etc).
In the DRP section of the stage, the organization investigates its functions performing a BIA in order to
identify and categorise the CBFs that are necessary for its survival. In this procedure the organization
has to (Aggelinos & Katsikas 2007) list the business functions and categorise them in order of
importance; link business functions to applications and systems; identify the functions that affect the
existence of the organization; assign RTOs and define RPOs for each business function; assign recovery
priorities according to organizational and technical criteria; define the term of the disaster for the
organization and the criteria for the activation of the plan according to the CBFs; consider its legal
responsibilities from the possible disaster; and estimate the potential loss revenue for every day
remaining “out of business” in order to have a possible trade off for extra emergency expenses. In order
to perform a meaningful BIA in this early stage of the development process, we consider the business
functions according to their significance regardless of the technology used to implement them
(manually or IS based). CBFs are categorised considering how they are supported by the Information
System.
The BIA will be completed after the decisions on the above issues are approved. These will form the
basis for the Risk Analysis of the IS. The Risk Assessment procedure has to assess the risks for the CBFs
only and not for all the functions, thus saving enough time and resources. The assessment will include
at a minimum (Aggelinos & Katsikas 2007) the general risks and their occurrence probability; the list of
the risks for any CBF and system; the link of the occurrence probability of any risk to every function or
system in order to find how probable it is for a system to be affected; the proposed solutions for every
combination: Risk-CBF or Risk-System. Dealing with a risk is directly connected to a cost-benefit analysis
in order to remain profitable for the organization (Baskerville 1993); define the security categorization
of the system(s) according to an appropriate standard such as, for medical information systems the CEN
ENV 12924 (CEN 1997); and define the disaster recovery policy of the plan according to the general
security policy. The completion of the RA will give the results as a basis for the next stage, the Feasibility
Study.
Here is the adopted position where the Feasibility Study can take place. The deliverable of this stage is a
report specifying – at least – the technical and business basis, the objects of the project, the associated
risks, the alternative solutions and finally the cost/benefits analysis. The above requirements take their
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information from the BIA, RA and the general report of the System Analysis. In the DRP parallel section
of the stage the organization has to investigate if the decisions for the EO system can be covered by the
budget (e.g. off site storage, kind of site, equipment, etc); the exact costs and benefits for the
organization from the development of such a plan; the real amount that needs to be budgeted for EO
according to the BIA, the RA and the proposed solutions (e.g. the total amount for recovery in 3 days is
100,000€ while for recovery in 10 days is 68,000€); and the changes that will be brought to the
organization from the development of the DRP (e.g. DRP coordinator position, testing of recovery
capabilities every year, predicting the annual budget for recovery purposes, etc). The results of the
study have to be documented in a report to the top management.
The next stage, System Design, is the most important stage of the SDLC because it gives the solution to
the problems and requirements. The design consists of the logical and physical design taking into
account also the human resources and the procedures established in the organization. Here is a basic
problem: the suited system changes the procedures of the organization (resistance to change due to
inconvenience) in contrast with the tailored system, which transforms manual procedures into
electronic ones (more expensive). The deliverable is a report containing all the specifications for the
construction of the new system. The importance of the stage is due to the fact that any fault or bigger
tolerance to problems may lead to insuperable obstacles which are translated to administrative
inconveniences or to big amounts of money necessary to fix the problem. Either case may lead to a
strong resistance to change, practical non-acceptance of the system and consequently general failure of
the project, resulting in a significant impact on the general strategy of the organization to realize its
targets.
The DRP section of the stage examines the operations/functions that have to be covered in EO, i.e. the
CBFs and some supportive functions. These are the business units; the procedures that will be
supported in each business unit; the operating applications; the necessary physical equipment to cover
the needs (e.g. two servers instead of five); the number of users that will be supported by business unit;
the connections of remote users or third parties; the required related security of the system (e.g.
persons that have physical access); special requirements only for EO (e.g. number of users connected to
an application at the same time, restrictions of printing etc); and practical tests according to a
methodology based on: 1) scenario, 2) trigger events, 3) a function, 4) a system (Aggelinos & Katsikas
2007).
After this, a corresponding report containing the specifications necessary to operate the system in EO
must be filed. This report will have as a basis the report that was produced for NO; this means that any
change or alteration to the Normal Operations report may lead to changes or alterations to the
Emergency Operations report. At this point, the parallel character of the SDLC enhancement ends and
the hierarchical character starts.
In the Implementation stage the software will be developed or adapted and the hardware will be
acquired to serve the software, both according to the specifications of the previous stage. The test &
documentation phases will have to be completed before the delivery of the system to the users for a
trial use. Any alterations coming from the trial phase have to be documented and the system is ready
for use. This stage has not finished yet.
In the DRP section the activities are strictly related to the kind of the site (cold, hot, warm) that has
been decided in the Strategy Planning stage. According to the kind of site the organization may have to
activate EO contracts or mutual agreements; rent a place for some days; buy or rent some equipment
for some days in order to execute tests; set up the EO system to work without users; count the real
RTOs and switching time; load the system with the predefined users; operate for some hours (if
possible); organize the off-site storage of the plan and its objects (e.g. data & application backups);
assess the procedures, designs, duties, responsibilities etc of the documented EO plan during a test;
define the time of reviewing the plan (e.g. anytime: alterations, semi-annually: check the corrections of
the alterations, annually: review the whole plan); educate a recovery team on the recovery procedures
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(e.g. in the knowledge of: the procedures’ specifications, their duties in the team etc [classroom
education]); and certify the whole system according to the standard decided in the Strategy Planning
stage.
The weaknesses observed during this execution have to be fixed, so as the Emergency Operations
system fulfils the requirements that have been decided for EO. After that, the Disaster Recovery Plan
has to be documented as a technical plan and it also has to include the procedures needed for its
implementation (e.g. who has to order the purchase of the equipment, its reception, the place to
receive it, the maximum time after the order etc). At the end of this stage, when the plan is not tested
yet, the legacy system should remain intact and operational as a contingency to the replaced
information system until, at least, the new system has been sufficiently tested (Swanson et al 202).The
Implementation stage is completed at the end of the DRP documentation phase.
With the last stage Maintenance, the System Life Cycle begins. This is the largest stage where the
system is fully operational and the organization makes the depreciation of the investment. During this
stage the organization may have some new requirements to fulfil or have to change/alter some existing
ones due to the changing environment (e.g. laws, new business units). Any change or alteration has to
be documented for the normal operations system. As for the DRP section, a decision has to be made, on
“Is this change/alteration an issue for the emergency operations system?” – changing, also, the DRP
documentation in the case of a positive answer. The specifications in hardware & software, the
produced data and their backup, the users etc have to be documented for implementation in EO
immediately after the end of the change/alteration, in a standard and controlled manner (Configuration
Management) (Ross et al 2009). If there are many or very important changes to be made on the IS, then
the Strategy Planning stage has to be executed again and a new smaller development cycle is starting.
The reviews of the whole Disaster Recovery Plan have to be performed in the predefined time aiming
the synchronization of the plan. The practical testing of the plan can take place in an empty room or in
the (contracted) cold site in order to check gaps in the plan, RTOs, RPOs etc. The duration and the
extent of the test depends on the obtainable budget and the importance that the management gives to
the recovery.
A practical issue that has to be made clear is that only one report deliverable is the outcome of any
stage. The report has two sections: the first for Normal and the second for Emergency Operations.
Table 1 summarizes the SDLC stages for N.O. system development and DRP activities and Deliverables.

Strategy Planning

System Analysis

Normal Operations
Activities & Deliverables
Stage activities for Normal Operations System
development

SDLC stages

-//-

X

X

DRP Activities

&

Deliverables

Site & Location
Kind of site
Business unit to be covered
Switching time to E.O.
Initial RTOs & RPOs
Maximum time in E.O.
Incorporation in the annual budget
Percentage of N.O. budget to E.O. budget
DRP coordinator
DRP alliances
Conformity standards
Revision time
Liabilities & responsibilities
Documented report
BIA
RA
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Feasibility Study

System Design

Implementation

Maintenance

Table 1.

4

Disaster Recovery Policy
Documentation of report
Investigation for the covering of the DRP needs
according to budget
Real amount according to BIA & RA
-//X
Changes to the organization
Cost & benefits
Documented report
Analysis of the functions for covering in E.O.
Business unit: procedures, users, remote
connections
-//X
Special requirements
Practical tests
Documented report
Stage activities for Normal Operations System development with deliverables
DRP activities according to the kind of site
Documented report
Stage activities for Normal Operations System development with deliverables
Is this change/alteration an issue for the emergency operations system?
Documented report

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

In the first four stages the DRP activities can work in parallel with the activities for the
development of the N.O. system. In the last two stages the DRP activities start when the
deliverables of the stage for N.O. system have been completed.

PRACTICAL BENEFITS

A proposal for modifying a methodology that has been set up and has functioned well for many years
may only be seriously considered when there are new significant needs to accommodate that are not
covered by the traditional methodology and when the stakeholders of the methodology benefit from
the modification. In the general case the stakeholders are the organization that the IS is being
developed for and the system developer.
The organization benefits from addressing DRP issues during the SDLC stages rather than after them
because:
It saves time, as the DRP can be completed a little after the completion of the implementation stage
for normal operation, thus reducing the time during which the organization is unable to handle a
disaster. The saved project time depends on the size and the extent of the IS.
It reduces the risks to the minimum in their origin as, having secured the CBFs, the risks that have a
significant impact on the organization’s ability to fulfil its obligations and purposes are reduced.
It can save human recourses, because all this time it will have assigned project responsibilities to a
team for the development of the system. That team may have several full-time members that could
work on the legacy system to resolve routine problems/failures.
It can learn the system at its basic needs, taking the experience close to the designers/technicians of
the manufacturer.
The above may be translated to monetary terms and be measured in order to give to the organization
an absolute monetary value of the DRP implementation during the SDLC.
On the other hand, the system developer is capable of handling the DRP design difficulties in the earlier
stages of the normal operations design. When a need for a DRP deliverable is known, a different
software design or arrangement can take place for the normal operations in order to serve the DRP
needs. As an example, recall that a hospital in emergency operation does not need all the X-ray images
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in its database; it only needs those of the in-patients. This need can be easily handled in the database
with just a flag triggered by the entry and the exit date and can be provided for in the backup and
restore procedures, either for a suited or a tailored system. If this provision has not been taken, the
restore procedure may take several hours, thus greatly increasing the RTOs. This kind of treatment
makes the DRP deliverable tailored to the special needs of an organization and increases the reputation
of the developer as a specialist. Moreover, the developer can achieve earlier project completion when a
requirement of the organization is a “DRP deliverable” – which tends to be a standard requirement in
the IS development nowadays. Starting the DRP project after the total completion of the normal
operations system is equivalent to the design of a system fitted to the special needs of an organization.
This period may be significant, depending on the organization and its emergency operation needs
making a significant time difference between the traditional SDLC and the proposed one. Additionally,
the developer can save human resources by allocating the designer/technician team to another project
in the time corresponding to the DRP deliverable. This option reduces the developer’s operational costs,
thus enabling him to make better offers and to be more competitive with the same number of
personnel. This cost reduction can be estimated more accurately if the complexity and the resources
needed for the development of the system are known.

DRP

System Design
Implementation
DRP

Maintenance
DRP

12 months development duration

DRP

Feasibility Study

System Analysis

Feasibility Study

System Design

Implementation
Additional time

DRP

System Analysis

Strategy Planning
12 months development duration

Strategy Planning

DRP

Figure 3 depicts the expected development time with and without the DRP-enhanced SDLC. It is evident
that breaking up the DRP activities and classifying them in the SDLC stages does not significantly affect
the total SDLC time.

DRP

Maintenance
DRP

Figure 3:

5

Development time with and without altered SDLC.

CONCLUSIONS

The development of an IS for an organization is a very time-consuming, specially budgeted project, the
failure of which can threaten the existence of the organization itself. Also, its importance to the
administrative function of the organization and to the fulfilment of its strategic and departmental
targets is beyond any discussion. Thus, the continuity of operations of the organization is based upon
the system to a large extent as the absence of the system makes the organization unable to fulfil its
administrative functions and consequently its obligations. By applying the proposed enhanced SDLC,
both the organization and the developer can save money by reducing the total time of the project,
while at the same time securing the operation of the CBFs by designing a system for EO.
The DRP development will be done taking into account experience and covering emergency operations’
needs in the design of the normal operations. This is a procedure that can be carried out without the
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pressure of a disaster. Also, cheaper or more adequate solutions can be forecasted in contrast with the
solutions obtained under the pressure of a disaster or of a 7/24 operated system.
Last, in the case of a system developed as part of strategic decisions, the existence of the system has to
be secured from its initial stages and to be continually secured after the end of its implementation in
order to ensure the fulfilment of the strategic goals of the organization.
The enhancement of the SDLC creates the need for another investigation, concerning the incorporation
of the DRP objects into the development methodologies that cover the whole system (h/w & s/w), like
SSADM or ISAC, and the difficulties that the developers meet using these methodologies. These
difficulties derive from the fact that an IT-DRP development is an SDLC for EO corresponding to an SDLC
for NO. This investigation is a subject of future research.
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